The power of referendum created by Article XVI was added to the Maryland Constitution in 1915 as a conscious modification of the principle of the principle of representative self-government. 6 The people, by reserving to themselves the right to accept or reject legislative decisions of the elected law-making body, became the final element in the legislative process. Their intervention by petition before the effective date of a statute suspends that statute; 7 it cannot "become a law or take effect until thirty days after its approval by a majority of the electors voting thereon." 8 Invoking the referendum process therefore creates a time "when the law is not a law." 9 Furthermore, rejection by referendum cannot technically constitute a repeal, for there is not yet a "law" to be repealed. Although Maryland has been able to enact minimal anti-discrimination legislation for public accommodations' 0 and employment practices" despite the referendum provision, the state's initial attempt in the area of open-housing became embroiled in a legal struggle at the very time national policy in this field was being firmly established. REv. 91, 138-54 (1949) .
'See Barnes v. State ex rel. Pinkney, 236 Md. 564, 575, 204 A.2d 787, 793 (1964) ; First Continental Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Director, 229 Md. 293, 299-304, 183 A.2d 347, 349-51 (1962 Since federal law already provides comprehensive protection, the question arises as to whether the separate states nonetheless have an affirmative duty to enact supporting legislation or to prevent repeal of existing legislation. This dispute frequently crystalizes in the context of a referendum attempt. Although the California Supreme Court has "grave doubts" as to the constitutionality of a proposed amendment to the state constitution which would have effectively repealed two existing open-housing laws and significantly impeded new legislation in the field, it refused to enjoin the referendum, preferring to pass on the question after the vote rather than "interfere with the power of the people to propose laws and amendments to the Constitution, and to adopt or reject the same at the polls."' 8 When the amendment was approved by a wide margin, 9 the court promptly struck it down in Mulkey v. Reitman" as involving state action infringing upon the fourteenth amendment by encouraging discrimination in real property transactions. In Otey v. Common Council of City of Milwaukee, z " however, the federal district court was less hesitant to act before the people had voted, and a referendum on a resolution to prevent any legislation on openhousing for a two-year period was enjoined. Emphasizing the tense social atmosphere," the court could see no adequate reason to allow a referendum. The proposed resolution was deemed unconstitutional on its face, 23 as the court felt that it would significantly involve the city in private discrimination violative of the fourteenth amendment by giving statutory assurance of non-interference. 4 existence of openhousing was no longer a question for public vote. The referendum, even if construed as nothing more than a poll, was "repugnant and offensive." 6 Although the result of a referendum may be voided as a deprivation of guaranteed rights," and the referendum itself may be enjoined if the suggested law is unconstitutional on its face 0 or the attempted repeal of existing law could be construed as encouraging unconstitutional behavior, 9 no decision as yet has dealt with the question posed in Spaulding v. Blair: whether a referendum should be enjoined when it is proposed not to derogate guaranteed rights, stifle future legislation or repeal present statutes, but only to determine whether a new law admittedly constitutional, will be enacted. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit decided that such a referendum should not be enjoined.
In Spaulding v. Blair, despite the plaintiffs' characterization of the referendum as an attempt to encourage discrimination by the repeal of an existing law, 3 0 the court chose to review the submission of Chapter 385 to the electorate presenting an opportunity for a possible "decision of the voters to forego the adoption of supporting legislation for the open-housing principle," which could in no way diminish the rights of any individual or group guaranteed under federal provisions.' There could be no contention that the referendum constituted a repeal of anti-discrimination legislation, for by the terms of the state constitution no such law has yet taken effect. Furthermore, even if eventual rejection at the polls could be Feb. 7, 1968 ; petition for cert. filed May 7, 1968) (Ohio Supreme Court denied an appeal from a lower court decision dismissing a challenge to the constitutionality of a city-wide referendum that would nullify an existing fair-housing ordinance 35 Rather, the holding of the referendum would be neutral, giving solace or support to neither side. 36 Just as the vote of a member of the General Assembly against Chapter 385 or the Governor's possible veto could not have been enjoined as a denial of equal protection to plaintiffs, so also the power of referendum was immune as an integral and constitutional feature of the state's legislative process. 37 Considerations of the federal system dictated that "to the extent that the states do not significantly involve themselves in deprivations of fundamental rights" their legislative processes should remain exempt from federal court restraints. 38 Since the proposed law, if approved by the voters, would be constitutional 39 and if rejected would in no way diminish plaintiffs' civil rights, 0 the mere submission of Chapter 385 to referendum could not abridge constitutionally-guaranteed rights and could not be enjoined. 4 Spaulding v. Blair concludes that a "neutral" referendum procedure, one which may be invoked to challenge any legislative enactment, may be constitutionally used any future ordinance regulating the sale or lease of real property "on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin or ancestry" must be subjected to referendum for approval by a majority of the voters before such ordinances could become effective." 3 The Court held that the charter amendment denied equal protection of the law by requiring a referendum in this area alone since it became "substantially more difficult" for persons seeking open-housing legislation to find success than for those who sought other ordinances dealing with the real property market. 4 Under the standard thus enunciated Maryland's Article XVI, which imposes no special burden upon anti-discrimination legislation, would appear unobjectionable. Furthermore, the Spaulding referendum procedure, unlike the constitutional amendment involved in Reitman v. Mulkey, 45 was not shown to have been created with the "intent ' 4 6 of encouraging racial discrimination or making open-housing legislation difficult to enact. 47 On the other hand, there remains the possibility that the Reitnian-Hunter majority could reverse Spaulding by focusing upon "the reality" of the Maryland referendum procedure's "impact. 1 46 Voiding the referendum process because of the practical disadvantage which it imposes upon minority groups seeking protective laws, however, would be tantamount to requiring that minority groups not be subjected to political processes and hurdles which are normally incident to legislative enactment. If carried to its logical extension, such a rationale might be used to impose an affirmative duty on the states to enact legislation favorable to minority groups who are politically incompetent to enact legislation for themselves; 4 9 and such analysis clearly would go far beyond the Court's holdings in Reitman and Hunter. Thus, since the Court is apparently not inclined to hold that the mere repeal of open-housing legislation in itself constitutes a denial of equal pro- 
